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Abstract: Many identity federations are designed to be used with web browsers. This paper proposes an approach
for integrating non web-based applications with web-based identity federations using Kerberos protocol. We
evaluate this approach by making NFS server available for users of SAML-based identity federation of Baden-
Württemberg state of Germany. We make use of LDAP-Facade software for federating non web-based ser-
vices. We have modified the web-interface component of LDAP-Facade to enable the registration with kerber-
ized services. Our approach can be used without modifications on the client side.
1 INTRODUCTION
Identity federations allow users to authenticate on
services hosted by external organizations with their
home organization accounts. Rather than storing all
identities in the same place, each organization is re-
sponsible for keeping an up to date information about
its users and authenticating them, becoming the Iden-
tity Provider (IdP). Service Providers (SP) consume
the information from IdPs they trust.
There are a number of technologies for establish-
ing identity federations. Authors of (Pérez-Méndez
et al., 2014) divide them into three groups:
 Web-based identity federations which base on
standards like SAML (Security Assertion Markup
Language), OpenID (Open Identity) or OAuth
(Open Authorization);
 AAA-based (Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting) identity federations. They use pro-
tocols like RADIUS or Diameter for data transfer.
Both of those protocols support EAP (Extensible
Authentication Protocol) for authentication. An
example of a federation of this type is the eduroam
network;
 Application-Agnostic Identity Federations, which
rely on Kerberos in cross-realm operation or on
middleware layers like GSS-API (Generic Secu-
rity Services API) (Linn, 2000) or SASL (Sim-
ple Authentication and Security Layer) (Melnikov
and Zeilenga, 2006).
In addition, Grid Trust Federations are based on
X.509 standard PKI and use GSS-API middleware
layer for authentication and authorization.
This paper focuses on web-based identity federa-
tions. On this type of federations the primary protocol
for communications with IdPs and SPs is HTTP, often
over TLS (Dierks and Rescorla, 2008). SPs usually
redirect browsers to the IdP for authentication and can
consume tokens from it.
However there are a lot of popular non web-based
protocols, for example SSH, NFS, RDP, IMAP or SIP.
Most implementations of these protocols can not use
authentication against web-based identity federations
out of the box yet, but instead support the Kerberos
authentication protocol.
In the first part of this paper we propose an ap-
proach how to pass a federated authentication result
to a service with Kerberos protocol as a mediator.
Our approach does neither require modification of the
Kerberos server nor of the service. Extensions on the
client side will be described.
In the second part we describe one way of how this
approach can be implemented in practice. We used
these components:
 NFS-Ganesha as an NFS (Network File System)
server implementation;
 SAML-based identity federation of Baden-
Württemberg state called bwIDM;
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 Modified LDAP-Facade as an implementation of
an SP and its LDAP-backend as a storage for
service-local data.
The main contributions of this paper are:
 A concept of integrating non web-based services
using Kerberos authentication into Web-based
identity federations;
 Evaluation of the concept through the deployment
of the experimental setup and its testing.
1.1 The Background
The primary motivation for this work was to enable
federated SAML-based user access via NFS to the
LSDF, Large Scale Data Facility at Karlsruhe Institute
for Technology (KIT) (Garcia et al., 2011). The ap-
proach which we were to propose as a solution had to
be general enough to allow federated access to other
non Web-based applications and protocols.
The Baden-Württemberg state in Germany has an
identity federation called bwIDM federation1. It in-
cludes several dozens of IdPs from different univer-
sities and several SPs. The bwIDM federation is a
subfederation of another federation, the DFN-AAI2 –
a Germany-wide identity federation for scientific in-
stitutions. DFN-AAI is based on SAML. Most of its
IdPs and SPs are using Shibboleth implementation of
SAML.
To add the SAML-based authentication features
to non web-based services the abstract layer called
LDAP-Facade was developed at Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology (KIT). It consists of an LDAP-server,
which is accessable for the non web-based services,
and a web-interface, which authenticates users with
SAML and allows them to manage data on the LDAP
server. They can register for a particular service (e.g.
add their entry to the LDAP), get their data, change
some parts of it (e.g. local service passwords), or un-
register (delete their entry from the LDAP).
LDAP-Facade is already used to federate several
non web-based services in KIT. Some of them store
scientific data for more than 100 000 students in
Baden-Württemberg. This data can be accessed via
various protocols, but no NFSv4-based access was
available at the time of this writing.
NFSv4 has several features some other protocols
lack:
 It is standardized and supported by all major OS;
1Föderiertes Identitätsmanagement der baden-
württembergischen Hochschulen, https://www.bwidm.de/,
last checked: 2015-02-27
2DFN-AAI, https://www.aai.dfn.de/, last checked:
2015-02-27
 It is scalable because of optional parallel opera-
tion (pNFS);
 It uses traditional Unix permissions model and
can use access control lists;
 It has a data encryption option.
Since Kerberos is the only protocol for user-based
authentication implemented by NFS servers (Adam-
son and Williams, 2014), we were looking for ways to
have the LDAP-Facade work with it. In the previous
version, NFS 4.0, it was required to implement two
alternative mechanisms for authentication: LIPKEY
and SPKM-3 (Shepler et al., 2003), but they were un-
supported by all major implementations and this re-
quirement was dropped in the NFS 4.1 standard (She-
pler et al., 2010).
The SAML-based bwIDM federation, LDAP-
Facade, Ganesha-NFS (as NFS server implementa-
tion) and Kerberos protocol served as building blocks
for the construction of a solution for the problem de-
scribed at the beginning of this section. Extending the
LDAP-Facade to Kerberos allowed us to apply the ap-
proach not only to NFS but to additional services as
well.
We found that our approach had nothing specific
to SAML or LDAP-Facade and we have extended it
to the abstract web-based federation.
1.2 Kerberos Authentication Protocol
The Kerberos protocol is described in detail in (Neu-
man et al., 2005). It requires a trusted third party and
uses symmetric key cryptography.
Figure 1: Typical Kerberos workflow.
The KDC (Key Distribution Center) is a server
part of Kerberos. It consists of two subservices: AS
(Authentication Server) and TGS (Ticket-Granting
Server). Tickets are used to verify the identity of the
client for a particular service.
The AS is responsible for user authentication
and for granting initial ticket (called Ticket Granting
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Ticket or TGT) which verifies the identity of a client
for TGS. Authentication is based on preshared key, so
AS has access to a database of keys for each client.
Usually, the client derives its key from the password
by using a string-to-key function. If an attacker man-
ages to capture AS_REP, he can try to bruteforce the
user password (Wu, 1999). The Kerberos specifica-
tion does not handle this and recommends the use of
complex passwords. To protect from active attacks
of this type AS can require pre-authentication before
issuing the TGT.
TGS is responsible for issuing service tickets. The
service ticket is encrypted by the service key. Every
service has such a key, hence communication between
service and Kerberos is unnecessary.
Figure 1 shows the three data exchanges required
to autenticate to a service: AS_REQ/AS_REP,
TGS_REQ/TGS_REP and AP_REQ/AP_REP.
The Kerberos standard allows multiple
AS_REQ/AS_REP data exchanges, if needed.
2 RELATED WORK
To address federated identity issues for non web-
based services, the Application Bridging for Feder-
ated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) working group
was established (Smith, 2012). They focus on cre-
ating a design that will combine the existing proto-
cols, such as RADIUS, EAP and SAML. The group
uses GSS-API to integrate the established mecha-
nisms with application protocols.
The implementation of the set of standards devel-
oped by the ABFAB working group is the Moonshot
Project. It requires modifications of servers, clients
and an IdPs (Pérez-Méndez et al., 2014).
In the same time authors of (Marín-López et al.,
2011) proposed an approach of integrating Kerberos
pre-authentication with existing AAA (Authentica-
tion, Authorization and Accounting) infrastructure
by using EAP. Their approach requires modification
of clients, Kerberos server, IdPs and modifies the
Kerberos protocol removing the “statelessness” from
Kerberos’s Key Distribution Server (KDC).
Two years later the same group of authors pro-
posed to employ an authentication mechanism in-
dependent of Kerberos (Pérez-Méndez et al., 2013).
They use Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA) as out-of-band protocol.
This enables the use of standard Kerberos servers, but
requires modified clients.
The scope of all these projects is the AAA-based
identity federations. This is a big drawback for or-
ganizations, who use web-based identity federations
instead, like bwIDM, because they are not designed
to support such protocols and it requires a lot of orga-
nizational and development work to integrate them.
An approach to federating non web-based ser-
vices in web-based identity federations was described
in (Köhler et al., 2012). The authors federate ser-
vices by developing access control modules, using ex-
isting security interfaces of particular services, e.g.
the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) inter-
face used by many unix services, for example by the
SSH-server. These modules consume assertions from
the IdP. This approach works with applications that
are able to use PAM.
The same group of authors extended their work
in (Köhler et al., 2013) including the web registra-
tion application, called LDAP-Facade, and offering a
generic LDAP interface to services. We use a mod-
ified LDAP-Facade to implement our approach in
practice.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
The main idea of our approach is to set up a web-
to-kerberos service. This service forwards successful
authentication against a web-based identity federation
to KDC. To do so, it sends the user her client key via
the HTTPS (HTTP+TLS) protocol to protect from un-
trusted network. This key can be obtained either man-
ually by browser or automatically by a key-obtaining
script on the client side.
In contrast to federated Kerberos approach, which
requires every user to authenticate with KDC in their
home organization, KDC in our approach operates on
the SP-side (which can be in external organization).
The services share their keys with that KDC. After
the user has obtained her key, she can obtain TGT
from KDC with the command-line tools (e.g. kinit).
Having TGT it is possible to get service tickets from
TGS to authenticate to the service. Figure 2 shows
this workflow.
In our experimental setup the workflow on Fig-
ure 2 takes place as part of the user’s initial subscrip-
tion to the service and should occur only once. The
actual use of the kerberized service is then possible as
per workflow on the Figure 1.
In the rest of this section we present the important
aspects which should be considered when implement-
ing the proposed approach.
3.1 Initial Key Placement
There are several options how the client key can be
generated on the web-to-kerberos service at the first
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Figure 2: Before AS_REQ: User gets Kerberos client key
with HTTPS.
time:
1. From service-local password, specified by user
with the web-service. As said before, if the pass-
word is simple, the attacker, who has the AS_REP
message can try to bruteforce it. Password com-
plexity checks should be in place.
The key sending step is unnecessary – the client
can derive it from the password on his own host;
2. From the result of base64 of a long random string;
3. From the result of keyed-hash message authen-
tication code (HMAC) (Krawczyk et al., 1997)
cryptographic mechanism with a long string as a
key (shared between web-service and KDC) and
user principal as a message. The KDC needs to
be modified to obtain keys dynamically from the
HMAC mechanism.
When the first or second option is used, KDC and
web-service must have access to a common key stor-
age. Most implementations of KDC support querying
data from a key storage with an LDAP protocol.
The third option can be used without common key
storage. The cost for this is the modification of a Ker-
beros service and difficulties on user account depro-
visioning.
3.2 Converting Federated User
Identifiers to Kerberos Principals
To make Kerberos Principals unique for users with
the same names, but from different organizations, the
Kerberos principal name should include the unique
name of the IdP. It may be difficult for a user to re-
member it, so some mapping from IdP names to short
name prefixes proved to be useful.
3.3 Authorization and Deprovisioning
The Kerberos standard (Neuman et al., 2005) does not
recommend services to base its authorization only on
ticket issuance because this check can be bypassed if
the application uses other authentication methods. If
it is necessary, the Kerberos server can be modified
to check client authorization before issuing each ser-
vice ticket. After the user account is deprovisioned
and has her record removed from the KDC database,
she is still able to authenticate with tickets she already
obtained. To minimize negative effects from it, the
maximum service ticket lifetime should be set to a
reasonably low value.
The authorization should be implemented on the
application level. Before the user is let in, the ap-
plication should check the user against her identity
federation. If the identity federation does not support
such types of checks, the application can make a re-
quest to SP web-service by using a common protocol,
like LDAP.
In our case, checks are done by the LDAP-Facade
and all provided attributes are mapped to a group-id
that can be used for authorization.
3.4 Security Considerations
Historically Kerberos protocol version 4 used only
DES (Data Encryption Standard) encryption, which
has an effective key size of 56 bits. This makes the
whole keyspace prone to brute-force attacks on mod-
ern hardware. In Kerberos version 5 the support of
other ciphers was added and DES was deprecated
by (Astrand and Yu, 2012). The DES encryption sup-
port should be turned off on both server and client.
To protect from replay attacks, a secure clock syn-
chronization protocol should be used where possible.
LDAP and HTTP protocols should be used only
with TLS.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate deployment efforts and operation of
our approach in practice, we implemented it using
Ganesha-NFS as service, extended LDAP-Facade as
an SP and bwIDM as a SAML-based identity feder-
ation. The rest of this section describes these com-
ponents and the extensions we developed to integrate
them into our implementation.
4.1 LDAP-Facade
Two major LDAP-Facade components are a web-
application and an LDAP-server.
The web-application is an SP in terms of SAML. It
allows a user to log in with her home IdP and register
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for one or several services. It keeps a database of reg-
istered users for each service which it makes available
to services via LDAP protocol. The LDAP directory
has a tree structure, the services’ data about users and
groups is located in non-intersecting subtrees (parti-
tions) of it. LDAP-Facade enables to store service-
local data (service-local password, local name, unique
identifiers, primary group identifier and so on) in the
attributes of the user entry.
The authors of LDAP-Facade use specially-
configured ApacheDS open source implementation
of LDAP-Server, which has a Kerberos server em-
bedded. This Kerberos server stores KDC-specific
data (principal names, client and service keys, key
version numbers) in the entries of krb5KDCEntry
class (which is subclass of krb5Principal). The Ker-
beros server is tightly integrated with the LDAP part
of ApacheDS, for example, if the user entry has a
krb5PrincipalName attribute, her keys are regenerated
after each password change.
Our first modification of LDAP-Facade was
made to assign krb5KDCEntry class to the freshly-
created user accounts. Mandatory attributes
(krb5KeyVersionNumber and krb5PrincipalName)
are also filled. ApacheDS stores Kerberos keys in
the krb5Key attributes of entries which belong to
krb5KDCEntry class. Each krb5Key attribute con-
sists of a key type and a key itself and is encoded using
ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation One) standard.
The second modification of LDAP-Facade al-
lowed user to download her Kerberos client key from
the web-service. The web-service redirects the user
to her home IdP for authentication following stan-
dard SAML Web Browser SSO profile (Hughes et al.,
2005).
4.2 NFS Specifics
We use Ganesha-NFS as NFS server, because it al-
lows to export clustered GPFS (General Parallel File
System) with pNFS protocol. Furthermore it works
in userspace, which allows debugging and patching it
more easily.
The setup with the NFS server implemented in
Linux kernel 3.19.0 on Gentoo Linux was also tested.
Both implementations support only Kerberos as
user-based authentication. They can operate in three
modes (security flavors):
1. krb5 requires user to prove her identity cryp-
tographically on each RPC request. Identity of
server is also verified;
2. krb5i is like krb5, but additionally protects in-
tegrity of the data on each RPC request;
3. krb5p is like krb5i, but prevents any data expo-
sure by encrypting it.
We use the NFS client as implemented in the
Linux kernel. It requires a userspace process rpc.gssd
to be launched. By default, to mount NFS, the princi-
pal of the client machine is used. Since our approach
does not provide any means to get principals for ma-
chines, this behavior should be turned off using the
‘-n’ option of rpc.gssd process.
NFS internally uses numerical user and group
ids, but not principal names. If information about
files owner and group is important, some mechanism
should be set up on the client to map numerical ids
to the readable names and vice versa. This can be
done statically by using the generic idmap mecha-
nism. More convenient way is to set Linux up to
use LDAP for such mapping with the Name Service
Switch mechanism.
Since NFS has a lot of specifics, it may be incon-
venient to require a user to mount NFS shares man-
ually. To make NFS mounting easier for the user we
developed a shell-script. This script executes the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Checks if required software is installed;
2. Checks that rpc.gssd process is launched with ‘-n’
option;
3. Asks user for her authentication credentials at IdP;
4. Authenticates on IdP and uses the data from it to
log in to SP;
5. Downloads Kerberos client-key from the SP in a
keytab format;
6. Uses Kerberos client-key to obtain TGT;
7. Mounts NFS share in the specified directory.
Steps 3-5 are optional if user already has its Ker-
beros client key. To avoid storing Kerberos client key
on physical storage, virtual file systems like tmpfs can
be used.
To access the share, each Linux user on the client
side must have a valid ticket. Usually, only superuser
can make a mount, so every other user should obtain
the ticket in order to use mounted share.
4.3 Other Tested Setups
The ApacheDS’s implementation of KDC is able to
serve only one Kerberos realm at a time. In the case
we have distinct set of users for each service, the other
implementation of the KDC may be used. We tested
our setup with MIT krb5 server. It stores all client
keys in the LDAP encrypted with master-key. To
be able to retrieve and decrypt keys the master-key
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should be shared between KDC and web-service. Us-
ing distinct Kerberos servers makes deployment more
difficult.
We successfully tried our approach also with SSH
and MongoDB (Enterprise server and a standard
client).
5 EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate our approach in terms of
deployability, usability, scalability and maintenance
efforts from the perspective of user, service provider
and identity federation.
The user does not need to deploy any non-standard
tool or do any specific configuration on her machine.
The Kerberos service ticket management can be done
with standard kinit program and NFS operations can
be performed with standard NFS client tools. The
initial registration phase can be completed with the
use of a standard web browser and, optionally, the
command-line script described in previous section.
Thus, the deployability and the usability of the ap-
proach are enabled for the user. For the user of the or-
ganisation hosting the kerberised service, the registra-
tion step might be not necessary if the service admin-
istrator has imported user home organisation data into
LDAP-Facade beforehand. For the external user the
registration provides means to use the service with-
out undergoing potentially complex procedure of cre-
ation of a user account in the organisation, thus im-
proving the usability of the service. The use of the
command-line script also helps to diminish the main-
tenance efforts for the Kerberos client key manage-
ment and NFS specific configuration for the user.
From the point of view of the service provider the
deployment of our approach does not require mod-
ification of the Kerberos server nor of the service.
Furthermore, if a service local identity management
system (e.g. local LDAP server containing local ac-
counts) exists beforehand, the migration to the LDAP-
Facade can be done seamlessly either migrating ex-
isting LDAP directory into LDAP-Facade or linking
it via LDAP proxying (Köhler et al., 2013). Using
LDAF-Facade instead of a plain LDAP server allows
the service provider to increase greatly the number of
the users of the service (the scale) by accepting them
from the whole federation instead of the local organi-
sation only. Depending on the policy of the service
provider, it can be configured to automatically ac-
cept new users joining the identity federation via their
home organisation IdPs. The scalability of the service
is enhanced by the registration interface which allows
to add user data to the LDAP-Facade directory easily.
From the perspective of the identity federation the
service provider integration can be done seamlessly,
without requiring adaptation of the existing compo-
nents of identity providers in the federation. The iden-
tity providers have to support WebSSO, ECP and As-
sertionQuery profiles of SAML standard. All three
profiles are supported by Shibboleth implementations
of the identity providers.
Though we have tested our approach with bwIDM
identity federation, it is not specific to it and can be
used with any SAML-based identity federation.
The implementation of our approach described in
this paper allowed us to provide NFS-based access
to LSDF facility to approximately 450,000 users of
bwIDM federation (Schlitter et al., 2014) in a deploy-
able, usable, scalable manner with minimal mainte-
nance efforts.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
In this paper we presented a general approach to inte-
grate web-based identity federations with non web-
based services that support Kerberos autentication
protocol. It does not require service or client mod-
ification or modification of standard protocols. The
components that should be set up are: web-service,
KDC service and a common database. We evaluated
this approach, using existing bwIDM identity feder-
ation and modified LDAP-Facade software as an im-
plementation of aforementioned components. For our
case deployment efforts were minimal. As non-web
based kerberized services we have chosen NFS, SSH
and MongoDB.
In the future we plan to test our approach with
more kerberized services. We will also work on the
improvement of commandline user tools for the man-
agement of their Kerberos credentials.
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